Which Product Will Survive To Be Standard?: Technology Adoption And The Role Of Governments by Tomohara, Akinori
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February 2006                                                      Volume 4, Number 2 
 7 
Which Product Will Survive To Be 
Standard?: Technology Adoption  
And The Role Of Governments 
Akinori Tomohara, (Email: jujodai@yahoo.com), The City University of New York Queens College  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While several surveys on technology diffusion have been undertaken, few attempts have been made 
to synthesize existing research to provide a framework for examining the role of governments.  Is 
government intervention really required to remedy market failures caused by network 
externalities?  This paper covers recent developments in this area, focusing on works in stochastic 
evolutionary game theory.  We relate the results of equilibrium selections to the role of 
governments. JEL classification: L1, L53 Keywords: Path Inefficiency; Market Failure; Network 
Externalities 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n a market of several competing products, which product will survive to become the market standard?  This 
question has been recognized as technology adoption in the presence of a network externality.  Typical 
examples include the choice between VHS and Beta VCRs and the choice among video games such as 
PlayStation 2, Game Cube, and X-Box.  Agents (or consumers) prefer to adopt a more popular technology (or 
product) in order to be able to share their technologies with other people.  Software compatibility matters to 
consumers.  
 
The literature has been explored this topic since the seminal work of Katz and Shapiro (1986).  A special 
issue of the Journal of Economic Perspective (1994) has a literature review on this issue (Katz and Shapiro; Besen and 
Farrell; Liebowitz and Margolis).  Among previous studies, Arthur (1989) is a pioneer work.  Using a simple 
stochastic process, he illustrates how an inferior technology can potentially drive out a superior technology in the 
adoption process.  Since the results depend on historical events, we are unable to predict the results a priori.  The 
literature provides similar implications using more sophisticated stochastic models (Arthur, Ernoliev, and Kaniovski, 
1987; Kaniovski and Young, 1995).  Network externalities may cause a market failure as inferior technologies 
dominate the market.  This problem is known as path-inefficiency.  
 
The issue of path-inefficiency attracts the interest of economists.  Does this market failure warrant 
government interaction?  If so, this result can drive policy. For example, governments may promote R&D in the 
private sector, such as supporting research of one broadband system. 
 
Few attempts have been made to synthesize existing research to assess the role of governments, although 
several surveys on technology adoption have been undertaken.  We cover the development in this area, specifically 
focusing on recent works in the stochastic evolutionary game theory.  Research regarding technology adoption has 
made great progress following the seminal articles by Foster and Young (1990), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), 
and Young (1993) (Börgers, 2001).  Their analyses have been instrumental in integrating stochastic approximation 
theory and technology adoption in the presence of network externalities.  However, sophisticated mathematical 
methodology has prevented proper attention from being given to the analysis.  This paper introduces their works using 
a simplified description.  We relate the results of equilibrium selections to the role of governments. 
 
I 
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Kandori and Rob (1995, 1998) and Young (1998) are prominent works in this area.  These authors reveal that 
the market selects socially desirable outcomes.  Their analysis is distinct from previous works.  In the standard 
argument, the utility of agents is increasing in the number of agents using the same technology.  Kandori and Rob, and 
Young introduce erroneous decision-making by agents using the notion of mutations or errors.  Some agents choose a 
technology randomly.  The notion incorporates the situation where agents are not familiar with market conditions.  In 
a dynamic technology adoption process, mutations or errors make it possible for a lagging but superior technology to 
catch up to a popular but inferior technology.  Pareto efficient market outcomes are the result.  In this case, the results 
imply no role for government intervention.   
 
Despite these appealing results, we should be careful in applying the analysis to real world industrial policies.  
It may take very long for the market to attain a stochastically stable equilibrium.  The analysis does not answer 
questions regarding the speed of convergence in the technology adoption process.  Government intervention may be 
desired to promote the adjustment process.  This situation is analogous to policy debates between New Classicalists 
and Keynesians in Macroeconomics.  Keynesians suggest utilizing government intervention in order to resolve 
disequilibrium, such as unemployment, in the short-run.  The main body of evidence provided by Kandori and Rob 
and Young, that a Pareto efficient outcome will emerge with bounded rational agents, is a breakthrough.  However, 
the models are by no means complete.  We conclude the paper with citations of the analysis’ possible restrictions, 
referring to findings in other studies (Cowan, 1991; Amable, 1992; Ellison, 1993; Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; An 
and Kiefer, 1995; Stoneman and Kwon, 1996; Dalle, 1997).  
 
STOCHASTIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES 
 
Nonergodicity Process 
 
Arthur (1989) provides a few features about technology adoption when network externalities are present.  He 
illustrates the possibility that an inferior technology, (which leads in popularity for some reason), may drive out a 
superior technology and survive to become the standard.  Let us start with the overview of his model.  His seminal 
work operates as a benchmark in the following discussion.  
 
  Two unsponsored technologies, A and B, are competing for potential adopters.  There are two disjointed 
groups of agents in population, R and S.  These groups have heterogeneous tastes.  Agents are randomly selected from 
the population, one by one, and choose one of the technologies.  The order is a random process.  Each type of agents is 
equally likely to be chosen at each time.  Agents prefer a popular technology due to network externalities.  A popular 
technology provides some convenience to agents; they can share software for the same hardware.  When making 
decisions, agents know the number of past adopters of the technologies.  Their decisions are irrevocable.   
 
The situation is modeled using the expected payoff matrix in Table 1.  Denote an  and bn  as numbers of 
previous adopters of each technology, A and B.  There are four constant variables. Assume that 0r , 0s , 
rr ba  , and ss ba  .  Agent R obtains ar rna   if s/he chooses the technology A.  The inequality, rr ba  , 
implies that the agent R prefers technology A to technology B.  Similarly, the inequality, ss ba  , implies that the 
agent S prefers technology B to technology A.  An agent’s utility is increasing in the number of agents using the same 
technology.  Two positive constants, r  and s , represent the degree of network externalities.  Agents are apt to 
choose a more popular technology if the effects of network externalities dominate the effects of their preference.  This 
means that, for example, agents choose to buy a Windows computer rather than a Macintosh computer despite their 
preference for Macintosh, if there are more Windows users than Macintosh users in the market.   
 
Figure 1 illustrates a process of technology adoption.  The label d  in the y-axis is the difference in numbers 
of previous adoption of the two technologies, ba nn  , when n  agents make decisions (in the x-axis).  A positive 
(negative) d  means that technology A is more (less) popular than technology B.  The solid wave represents the 
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adoption process of technologies.  The figure illustrates a case where technology A is initially more popular than 
technology B but technology B eventually catches up and dominates the market. 
   
The lock-in process of technology B is explained using the concept of absorbing barriers.  An absorbing 
barrier is the level of market dominance, where the effect of a technology’s network externalities dominates the effect 
of an agent’s preference toward the other technology.  If the adoption process crosses either absorbing barrier, one 
technology dominates the market and the other technology disappears from the market.  Both types of agents keep 
choosing the same technology.  
 
The dotted horizontal lines in Figure 1 are the absorbing barriers ( s  and r ) for each technology, A and 
B.  For example, although the agent R prefers technology A to technology B, the agent will switch his choice from A 
to B if technology B dominates a certain level of the market, r.  Hereafter, technology A is no longer chosen and, 
consequently, disappears from the market.  The situation is described by the inequality, 
r
ba
ba
rrnnd

 = r 
(or equivalently brar rnbrna  ).  The analysis captures agents’ inconvenience from the use of a less popular 
technology.  For example, agents cannot share PlayStation 2’s software with Xbox users (and vice versa).  As a result, 
an unpopular technology will disappear from the market.  Similarly, once technology A dominates the significant 
level of the market, agent S will switch her choice from technology B to technology A, despite of her preference for B 
over A.  The inequality, 
s
ba
ba
ssnnd

  = s (or equivalently bsas snbsna  ), describes the 
situation. 
 
In the example, technology adoption is dependent on historical events.  A technology, which leads with 
popularity for some reason, survives to be standard.  Such an evolutionary process is nonergodic.
1
 Nonergodicity 
creates the possibility of inefficient market equilibria.  In the present case, an inferior technology may drive out a 
superior technology.  David (1985) provides empirical evidence.  The technologically inferior QWERTY keyboard 
was in competition with a superior keyboard, Dvorak.  It was the QWERTY keyboard that survived to become the 
market standard. When network externalities lead to inferior technologies dominating the market, the problem is 
known as path-inefficiency.  The market outcome depends on the adoption process (i.e., history).   Hence, outcomes 
cannot be predicted a priori.   
 
The literature has derived similar implications using more sophisticated models (Arthur, Ernoliev and 
Kaniovski, 1987; Kaniovski and Young, 1995).  One technology dominates the market.  However, there is no 
guarantee that a superior technology will be selected in the technology adoption process.
2
 The results imply that the 
market mechanism may not work in the presence of network externalities.  Externalities cause market failures.  This is 
a familiar result of new classical economics.  A policy question is whether government intervention can remedy the 
market failures.   
 
Arthur (1989) illustrates how governments are powerless in preventing market failures.  Suppose that 
technology A is superior to technology B (i.e., sr  ).  The government gives a subsidy, g , to A, and levies a lump 
sum tax, t , on B.  Table 1.2 shows the new payoff matrix.  The policy encourages the adoption of technology A and 
deters use of technology B.  However, the government cannot prevent the lock-in of the inefficient technology B, as is 
shown in Figure 1.  The current absorbing barriers shift to r’ and s’: s’
s
btga ss   < 

s
ba ss s for 
technology A and r’
r
btga rr   < 

r
ba rr  r for technology B.  Even after the shift, absorbing barriers remain.  
                                                          
1 An ergodic process means that “its long-run statistical behavior is essentially independent of the path taken, and in particular is 
independent of the initial conditions (Young, 1998, p.10).”  More formally, a Markov process is ergodic if an asymptotic 
distribution )|(lim)|(
00 zzzz t
t


  is independent of an initial state 0z , where )|( 0zzt  is an empirical 
distribution (or frequency) when a state z  is visited during first t  periods. 
2 A non-evolutionary game approach reaches the same conclusion of path-inefficiency (e.g., Amble, 1992).  
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Government intervention may help to delay the lock-in of an inefficient technology, but government intervention does 
not alter the results of technology adoption.  The implication here is different from that of the new classical 
economics, where governments can internalize externalities in zero transaction cost situations. 
 
Ergodic Process 
 
Non-ergodicity limits the analysis of technology adoption.  We cannot predict long-run market equilibrium.  
Equilibrium varies depending on the adoption processes (or history).  An inefficient equilibrium could result since an 
inferior technology may survive and become standard.  However, more recent studies provide different results.  In 
these more recent studies, technology adoption is independent of history.  The market selects a Pareto efficient 
equilibrium.  Let us examine what causes the differences in outcomes by referring to prominent works in this area. 
 
Ergodicity is attractive property.  A technology adoption process will result in one of technologies being 
adopted independent of initial states.  Kandori and Rob (1995, 1998) obtain the property by introducing two concepts, 
mutation and a long-run equilibrium (LRE).  Mutation implies erroneous decision-making by agents.  Agents 
maximize their expected payoffs, yet mutant agents select a technology based on different principles, such as a 
random choice.  Mutants are not maximizing expected payoffs as standard agents do.  Mutation incorporates minor, 
yet possible, mistakes by agents in the decision making process.  Such errors are possible if agents do not have 
complete information regarding which technology predominates in the market.  Mutation also incorporates the idea of 
entrepreneurs.  Entrepreneurs seek new and potentially better technologies despite their short-run costs (Schumpeter, 
1942).  Contrary to Arthur’s model, where agents have complete information and never make mistakes, mutations 
create a framework where lagging technologies can catch up to a popular technology.  Technological innovation 
progresses as time passes.  Kandori and Rob’s model allows a new, superior, technology replace an old, inferior, 
technology, despite the fact that the former enters the market later.  The contribution of their model is the inclusion of 
the long-run equilibrium concept.  Mutants’ decisions perturb the technology adoption process.  LRE is a state, which 
is not upset by the repeated perturbation of mutations.  LRE guarantees the stability of the equilibrium. 
 
Let us outline Kandori and Rob’s model.  This clarifies what their analysis intends to remedy.  An agent is 
chosen randomly from a finite population, M.  The agent selects one technology from n  alternative technologies.  Let 
a state be represented by ),...,( 1 nzzz  , where iz  is the number of agents choosing technology i .  We denote the 
payoff for the agent who chooses technology i , when other agents choose technology j , as iju .  The expected 
payoff for an agent choosing technology i  is: 
 
              ],[
1
1
])1([
1
1
)(
1
ii
n
j
ijjiii
ji
ijji uuz
M
uzuz
M
z 



 

 
 
given the state        ni iin MzMzzzz 11 ,,...,1,0|,..., .    
 
Rational agents select the technology which gives them the highest expected payoff.  However, some agents 
make erroneous decisions.  They choose the technology that may not give them the highest expected payoff.  Two 
factors determine the probability of mutation interactively.  Let the error rate be )1,0( .  Suppose potential 
mutants have a prior belief about the popularity of technologies.  Denote this belief as the distribution, 
 nmmm ,...,1 , where ,11  
n
j j
m  and )1,0(jm .  Agents choose technology j , with probability of 
0jm , even though technology k  provides them the highest expected payoff.   
 
Sizeable contribution notwithstanding, this approach is not adequate in its treatment of incomplete 
information.  Notice state z  in the expected payoff function.  Most of the agents in the model have complete 
information about the number of past adopters. The model attempts to incorporate incomplete information of agents 
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using the idea of mutation.  It is more natural that agents do not have enough information regarding the number of past 
adopters.  Hence, decision-making concerning technology adoption should be modeled jointly with information 
acquisition (Wozniak, 1993). 
 
Young (1993, 1998) introduces sampling to a game similar to Arthur (1989).  Assuming none of the agents 
have enough knowledge of technology popularity, an agent collects data on past technology adoption by other agents 
in opponent groups.  Sample range is limited over the agent’s bounded memory of the last m  periods.  Agents 
calculate expected payoffs based on the sample and choose a technology in order to maximize their expected payoffs.  
Some agents select a technology randomly with an error rate of  , regardless of their expected payoffs.  These agents 
are analogous to mutants in Kandori and Rob.  Despite the similarity, Young’s model includes two channels where 
errors can arise: mutation and sampling bias.  The approach is a more pertinent treatment of incomplete information. 
 
 Let us illustrate Young’s model using a simple case.   Suppose there are two disjoint groups of agents in 
population, R and C, with heterogeneous tastes.  Each agent chooses a technology, A or B, with the following payoff 
matrix.   
 
 
  Column 
   A B 
Row 
A a11, b11 a12, b12 
B a21, b21 a22, b22 
 
 
Agents’ utility varies depending on a technology’s popularity.  Let itp  be the proportion of i  agents who 
have chosen technology A up through time t, and itp1  be the proportions who have chosen technology B, where 
ri   for row agents and c  for column agents.  Each agent draws a random sample of size s  from the past decisions 
of the other agent over his/her bounded memory of the last m  periods.  Agents judge the probability vector ( 'itp , 
'1 itp ) based on his/her sample.  Table 1.3 shows the expected payoff for each agent at time t.  Agents choose a 
technology consistent with utility maximization.  However, there is a minor probability, , that agents choose a 
technology randomly.  We call this probability an error rate.  The error rate incorporates erroneous decisions due to 
incomplete information about market prosperity.  In addition to incomplete information causing error, some 
entrepreneurs, who have the long-run prospect, may want to try either technology regardless of their myopic expected 
payoffs.  Young proves that, if agents have only incomplete information (more precisely, 210  ms ), the 
technology adoption process converges to an efficient equilibrium independent of history (i.e., ergodic). 
 
Previous results can be reproduced more generally under Young’s framework.  Agents in Arthur’s model 
know the exact number of past adopters of technologies.  Notice that, if the sample size s  increases, then the 
empirical frequency distribution 
'
itp  approaches to the true probability in the entire population, itp .  Arthur’s model 
is the extreme case where the sample size corresponds to infinite memory, and no error.
3
 In fact, Kaniovski and 
Young (1995) show that, with a sufficiently large sample size and a sufficiently small error rate, the stochastic process 
of technology adoption results in either technology being adapted (if there exist two pure and one mixed equilibria). 
The result of equilibrium selection is unpredictable since it depends on the initial state of the process.  Thus, the 
problem of path-inefficiency remains (i.e., an efficient equilibrium is not guaranteed). 
 
                                                          
3 His approach is classified as a fictitious play with infinite memory.  A fictitious play means that agents “choose best replies to the 
empirical distribution of their opponents’ previous actions [Young (1998), p. 28].”   
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The analyses in Kandori and Rob (1995, 1998) and in Young (1998) imply that government intervention is 
unnessesary.  The market selects a Pareto efficient equilibrium in their models, without government intervention.  The 
literature also provides a negative opinion regarding policy adjustments.  However, their rationaliztions are different 
from that of Kandori and Rob and Young (Cowan, 1991; Dalle, 1997).  Dalle (1997) argues that government 
intervention is valid only when governments have an informational advantage over adapters regarding the quality of 
technologies.  This is analogous to policy implications derived from the rational expectation hypothesis in 
Macroeconomics.  There is no reason to believe that governments are better informed than agents in the market.  
Additionally, the effects of mutation are trivial when compared to influence of network externalities (or global 
externalities).  The standardization of dynamically inefficient technologies is likely to occur. Market failures caused 
by network externalities are beyond governments’ control.    
 
Market Share And Agents’ Tastes 
 
Similarly, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) can be remodeled using Young’s framework.   Kandori, 
Mailath, and Rob provide a proto-type of Kandori and Rob.  The former considers the selection of two technologies.  
We use a symmetric payoff matrix since their analysis assumes a single population (or homogeneous taste among 
agents). 
 
 
  Column 
   A B 
Row 
A a11, a11 0, 0 
B 0, 0 a22, a22 
 
 
Let tp  be the proportion holding technology A in the population of size m  at time t .  One agent is drawn 
from the population at random.  The agent draws a random sample of size s  from the population.  The agent 
evaluates their expected payoff based on the sample proportions, 'tp .   An agent has an expected payoff of '11 tpa  
with the selection of technology A, and has an expected payoff of )1( '22 tpb   with the selection of technology B 
(see Table 1.4).  With probability 1-, the agent chooses either technology A or B, maximizing the expected payoff.  
With probability, , the agent plays a random strategy with an equal chance of selecting either technology. 
 
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob’s model does not differ substantially from Young’s model regarding Pareto 
efficiency of equilibrium.  The two models do differ in agents’ preferences, homogenous tastes (symmetric payoffs) in 
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob’s model, and heterogeneous tastes (asymmetric payoffs) in Young’s model.  
Heterogeneous tastes play a role in determining a market share (i.e., whether the market will be divided among 
technologies or not), but are irrelevant regarding the selection of an efficient technology.  Young’ general analysis 
incorporates Kandori and Rob’s model.  Kandori and Rob’s implications are still valid under Young’s framework.  
The market selects socially desirable outcomes with bounded, rational agents.   
 
Previous works with unbounded (or infinite) memory yield the same implication.  Arthur, Ernoliev, and 
Kaniovski (1987) show that technology adoption converges to either one of the r technologies or to a split market 
share.  A split market occurs if the effects of heterogeneous tastes dominate network effects.  In Arthur’s example, a 
split market results with a nonlinear payoff, such as  )exp(1 ar rna   for R agents.  Similarly, Kaniovski and 
Young (1995) prove that, if there is only a unique mixed equilibrium, a technology adoption process converges, with 
probability one, to the equilibrium with sufficiently large sample size and sufficiently small error rate. 
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STRATEGIC PRICING AND LOCAL EXTERNALITIES 
 
This section discusses possible restrictions in the Kandori and Rob and the Young models.  A good place to 
start is with the competition between Beta and VHS videocassette recorders.  Beta (developed by Sony) lost its market 
share to the latecomer, VHS, and withdrew from the VCR market, despite its better visual quality.  It is known that 
VHS could catch up with Beta, and eventually dominate the VCR market, partly because its license was shared among 
rivalry manufactures. Inter-firm coordination reduced the price of VHS via collaborative R&D efforts among 
manufactures.  Hence, it is not always true that a superior technology will survive in the market by driving out an 
inferior technology.   
 
Pricing strategies by companies (or sponsors) perform a crucial role in deciding market share.  The models in 
the previous section focus on the demand side and miss the interaction between supply and demand.  Katz and Shapiro 
(1986) highlight the importance of strategic pricing.  They consider a two-period model where agents select either a 
sponsored or unsponsored technology.  Their analysis shows that the sponsored technology is more likely to be 
adopted.  A sponsored technology establishes market dominance by pricing below marginal cost in the first period.  
Such investment is compensated by pricing above marginal cost in the second period.  Amable (1992), in a more 
recent work, makes a similar point.  
 
Contrary to these works, the stochastic evolutionary models may be perceived as a discussion focused on 
unsponsored technologies.  In the VCR example, license sharing and collaboration provide cost advantages to VHS 
producers.  The seminal work of Katz and Shapiro and their successor provide a good explanation of the 
standardization of technology using pricing strategies.   
 
Objections to the discussion above have been raised.  The aforementioned non-evolutionary game literature 
utilizes agents with perfect foresight (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1986).  The analysis is analogous to Arthur’s model.  A 
pricing strategy manipulates the level of absorbing barriers and promotes the lock-in of a sponsored technology.  
Arthur illustrates this using taxes and subsidies.  The situation is a special case in evolutionary game models.  Models 
by Kandori and Rob and Young handle cases that are more general by introducing mutation and bounded memory.   
 
One may also claim that the evolutionary game approach implicitly includes the supply side arguments in 
agents’ payoff functions.  The payoff functions are increasing in the number of past adopters of a technology.  This 
captures the convenience of sharing the same technology with other people.  The embedded idea is that a popular 
technology increases the demand for the technology through a decreased price.  A popular technology brings a higher 
level of current (and expected future) profits.  This encourages investment in the technology.  More investment 
improves the probability of successful R&D.  Innovation reduces the price of the technology via lower production 
costs.  This logic (discussed by Amable, (1992)) is implicitly captured by the fact that expected payoff functions are 
increasing in the number of past adopters.   
 
Next, Kandori and Rob and Young models perceive network externalities as global externalities, but not as 
local externalities.  Agents in their models are concerned with the number of past adopters of technologies in the 
population.  Individual’s decision-making regarding technology adaptation is likely influenced by the community 
rather than by the population.  For example, take a case where an individual is about to buy a DVD recorder.  Yet the 
individual is unfamiliar with the popularity of products.  That person will probably ask their community, their friends 
and colleagues about their DVD recorders.  
 
Simulation studies yield different conclusions, which depend on a variety of scenarios.  An and Kiefer (1995) 
show standardization of a superior technology assuming sponsored technologies, revocable decision, and local 
externalities.  Dalle (1997) considers the trade-off effect between diversity and coordination.  Agents have 
heterogeneous tastes.  However, they can benefit from the selection of a popular technology in the community due to 
local externalities.  He reveals that technologies can coexist when heterogeneous tastes effects dominate the effect of 
local externalities.  One technology survives with niches when the effect of local externalities dominates 
heterogeneous taste effects.  A pure standardization of technology appears when global externalities are included 
along with local externalities and heterogeneity.   
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The literature in area of non-evolutionary game theory is also informative (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; 
Stoneman and Kwon, 1996).  In these models, five factors determine technology adoption under network externalities.  
They are characteristics of agents, the number of past adopters, the timing of adoption, the cost of adoption, and 
information asymmetries among agents.  Their analysis considers the situation where an uninformed agent acquires 
the information about technologies from informed agents.  The decision of uninformed agents is affected by those 
with whom they have contact (i.e., local externalities).  Costs of adopting a technology vary, since each agent has 
different abilities regarding learning the nature of technologies.  Using a case study from the U.K. engineering 
industry, empirical analysis indicates the difficulty in determining which factors play a dominant role in technology 
diffusion.  The reality is so complicated. 
 
It is difficult for a government make inferences regarding an industrial policy’s effectiveness when outcomes 
vary on a case-by-case basis.  Kandori and Rob (1998) provide a clear-cut role for the government: governments do 
not have to take any action.  The market mechanism selects the superior technology.  Their new analysis incorporates 
characteristics of technologies such as prices, quality, and compatibility as costs of technology adoption.  Specifically, 
they distinguish inward incompatibility (i.e., the degree of compatibility that a technology can use other technologies) 
from outward incompatibility (i.e., the degree of compatibility that other technologies can use the technology).  Even 
with the relaxed assumptions, their results from the previous model are still valid.  A Pareto dominant technology is 
attainable as a unique long-run equilibrium, independent of the initial state. 
 
Finally, the stochastic evolutionary game models lose their predictive power if either technology is not Pareto 
dominant over the other technology.  Consider, for example, the case of driving on the right-hand-side or left-hand-
side of the road.  We keep right in the U.S. when driving a car, but Japanese keep to the left.  Correspondingly, 
driver’s seats are on the left side of U.S. cars and on the right side of Japanese cars.  Each country chooses a different 
rule, though most Americans and most Japanese are right handed.  Another example appears in Kirman (1993).  This 
study examines the choice between two identical, adjoining restaurants.  When either technology is not superior to 
each other, either one or the other becomes dominant in the market.  Fortunately, in this case, it is not of great 
consequence which technology is adopted, since both technologies are efficient.  Government intervention is not an 
issue in this case. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper considers a dynamic technology adoption process in the presence of network externalities.  It does 
so by referring to findings in stochastic evolutionary game theory.  The results of equilibrium selections have 
important implications for the role of governments.  While the seminal work of Arthur (1989) illustrates the possible 
path inefficiency, Kandori and Rob and Young models show that the market attains a Pareto efficient outcome even 
with the presence of network externalities.  The new concepts of mutation and bounded memory make the results of 
Kandori and Rob and Young appealing.  Neither analysis prescribes the necessity of government intervention.  
 
While the analyses are verisimilar, we should be careful interpreting their policy implications.  The analyses 
do not answer questions pertaining to convergence in the technology adoption process.  It may take long time for the 
market to reach equilibrium.  This point reminds us of macroeconomic policy arguments between New Classical and 
Keynesian economists.  New classicalists avoid government intervention.  Market mechanisms attain equilibrium in 
the long- run.  Keynesians claim that the process is too slow.  Government intervention is required to resolve 
disequilibrium (such as an unemployment) in the short-run.  Long waiting time until equilibrium introduces other 
elements important to consider.  An example involves changes in the number of technologies, as in Ellison (1993).  
Although several literatures assume a constant number of technologies in the market, withdrawals from and entries 
into the market of technologies occurs frequently.  As a result, the quality of technologies also evolves over time.   
 
Another interesting extension involves considering the diffusion process of a local standard into a global 
standard.  An issue of recent political interest is the standardization of accounting systems worldwide.  Accounting 
systems are developed in each country, in the presence of local externalities.  The global economy requests integration 
of each local system into a global standard.  The analysis here provides governments with potentially useful 
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information concerning this issue.  Similar types of policy implications will be relevant when planning global 
standards (such as taxation) for international business.   
 
We may want to extend the argument to include plural technology adoption.  Acquiring language skills is an 
example.  Descendents of foreign-originated citizens are often bilingual (i.e., their parent's tongue and English).  In 
some cases, agents may adopt a few, new, technologies without abandoning a current, old, technology.  Additionally, 
language adoption provides a framework for examining the interaction between local and global externalities.  Agents 
learn languages from communities, their families and school friends.   They are also influenced by society as a whole, 
via media influences.  Technology adoption can be formalized as a function of agents’ abilities, along with cultural 
characteristics.  Some foreign-originated citizens are observed to make a greater effort to maintain their original 
cultures when compared to others.  Social policy implications could be inferred from this type of analysis.  The 
aforementioned topics represent potential future lines of research. 
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Figure 1 - Stochastic Process Of Technology Adoption 
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Table 1 - Payoff Matrixes 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 
 Technology A Technology B 
R-agent 
ar rna   br rnb   
S-agent 
as sna   bs snb   
 
 
 
Table 1.2 
 Technology A Technology B 
R-agent grna ar   trnb br   
S-agent gsna as   tsnb bs   
 
 
 
Table 1.3 
 Technology A Technology B 
R-agent a11pct’+a12 (1-pct’) a21pct’+a22 (1-pct’) 
C-agent b11prt’+b21 (1-prt’) b12prt’+b22 (1-prt’) 
 
 
 
Table 1.4 
 Technology A Technology B 
agent a11pt’ b22 (1-pt’) 
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NOTES 
